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SUBJECT: SHOW ME THE MONEY: MAKING THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION
FUNCTION

SUMMARY

¶1. (SBU) The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) held a March 11 meeting to inform and seek input from the international community on the functioning of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and efforts to re-energize the Second Chamber for Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories. There was consensus among the international community that payments to CFC representatives should be reduced. AMIS asserted that the mid-March Joint Commission meeting scheduled for El Fasher would be delayed and occur elsewhere, on account of "unstable" security conditions in Darfur. The Force Commander professed that he was unable to give a timeline on the completion of the areas of control exercise or AMIS re-configuration into three sectors. End summary.

STRENGTHENING THE CFC AND SECOND CHAMBER CHALLENGES

¶2. (SBU) Acting AMIS Head of Mission Monique Mukaruliza convened international partners March 11 in Khartoum to provide an update on the status of the CFC and hear international views on recommendations to strengthen the mechanism. AMIS proposed reducing each of the DPA signatories representation to two representatives per faction at the CFC headquarters in El Fasher and one representative at each of the 31 Sector HQ and Military Group Sites (MGS). By this configuration, the total number of CFC representatives would equal 198. AMIS recommended cutting the Monthly Subsistence Allowance (MSA) for CFC officials to \$1000 (from \$4900) at the CFC HQ level and to \$500 (from \$2700) at the Sector levels. The international community expressed universal support for the reduction in the MSA. (Note: Until recently, MSA for CFC reps and AMIS forces were backlogged as the UK and Netherlands - which provide the funding - attempted to reconcile numerous accounting discrepancies. The excessive MSA payments have had a distorting effect on the CFC, creating incentives for participation because of lucrative salaries rather than the ability to examine ceasefire violations or access respective areas of control. End Note.)

¶3. (SBU) Noting the warped incentives created by the MSA, AMIS proposed creating clear terms of reference for the CFC representatives and rotating them on a six-month basis. S/CRS Poloff and other diplomatic officials noted the problems this might create in terms of continuity and capacity. He suggested that it would be more effective to devise one-year agreements with each CFC representative that would be renewable in consultation with the AMIS Force Commander and account for performance. AMIS concurred with these recommendations.

¶4. (SBU) AMIS Force Commander Aprezi summarized the challenges

facing the CFC Second Chamber, including the non-payment of MSA since August 2006; the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Non-Signatory Faction (NSF) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)/Peace Wing's insistence on adhering to the modalities of the N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (vice the DPA); and the absence of Government consent to allow non-signatory deployment to the Sector level. Aprezi proposed various schemes to distribute non-signatories at different levels throughout Darfur, though each remains predicated on Government approval. S/CRS Poloff noted the lack of progress on the issue since the February 7 Joint Commission, in which nearly every participating delegation pressed for the Sudanese government's acquiescence, and recommended that key countries (U.S., UK, Norway, Netherlands, Canada, Germany, France, Egypt) - in conjunction with AMIS, the UN, League of Arab States and EU - launch an immediate renewed, unified effort to gain Government agreement. Without non-signatory representation within the CFC structure, ceasefire violation investigations and facilitation of AMIS or humanitarian access into SLA/NSF or JEM-controlled areas will remain difficult if not impossible.

AMIS FEELING BESEIGED

15. (SBU) In a brief security update, the Force Commander characterized the situation in Darfur as "unstable," as manifested by continued carjackings, tribal fighting and specific attacks on AMIS personnel. Aprezi's sense of besiegement was clear as he recounted a series of events targeting AMIS, including the robbery of a Finance Officer on February 28, the killing of two soldiers in Graida on March 5, and the theft of property and arms from a helicopter patrol near Kulbus on March 7. AMIS placed the blame for the Graida attack squarely on SLA/Minawi. Mukaruliza said that she intended to address the matter with Senior Assistant to the

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President and SLA leader Minni Minawi, demanding that he hand over the perpetrators. In this vein, Head of the DPA Implementation Team Sam Ibok urged the international community to publicly, but even-handedly, hold the rebel movements to account, implying that without this pressure the factions would be more likely to operate with impunity and decline participation in the peace process.

16. (SBU) Responding to questions about AMIS re-organization Aprezi professed his inability to predict when the peace-keeping force might be reconfigured to three Sectors. "This must be a joint decision with the UN," he explained. On the issue of AMIS verification of factions' areas of control, the FC again punted, remarking that it was impossible to complete the exercise without the consent of the non-signatories and greater stability in Darfur. Both Ibok and Mukaruliza countered Aprezi's assertion, contending that more could be done in this effort, that hard deadlines should be provided to all the groups (including non-signatories), and that the Force Commander should present a clear timeline at the next Joint Commission meeting.

COMMENT

17. (SBU) While AMIS' increased engagement on the CFC issue with the international community is a positive step, it does little to change the fundamental truth that without SLA/NSF and JEM representation at the Sector level and Sudan's consent to allow such a move, the mechanism will continue to be inhibited in carrying out effective cease-fire investigations and in maintaining open lines of communication with non-signatory factions. A concerted and synchronized effort by the international community to persuade the Government to change its position may be the only way forward in enhancing the viability of the CFC, which remains at the heart of advancing any real prospects of DPA security arrangements. End comment.

HUME